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• Daw Aung San Suu Kyi • Dr.Sein Win • others Printable Version

Burma at the Crossroads: Prospect for a political change

By Dr. Thaung Htun
Representative for UN Affairs, NCGUB

International Strategy Meeting for Burma

Bangkok, Thailand
March 17-19

Good morning friends,

It's a pleasure to meet all of you at this crucial moment of the Burmese democracy movement. The recent news about talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC, which was revealed to the media after the visit of the UN Special Envoy at the beginning of the year, has presented us with a great puzzle. The news has filled our minds with questions. What are the substance and direction of these talks?

Is this a real breakthrough that will lead to a democratic transition in Burma? How should we respond to this political development and what should be the strategy of our movement? This conference provides us the opportunity to brainstorm about various issues and I hope that we will be able to develop a consensus vision and strategy by the end of the meeting.

We have seen the regime moving from a position at the beginning of the year 2000 of trying to crush the NLD to an approach at the end of the year of actually talking with the NLD. This movement indicates that the regime has decided it cannot crush the NLD and must therefore find another way to deal with the problems it is facing.

As far as we know, talks in Rangoon up to now are serious and consistent. General Khin Nyunt, with the agreement of the entire SPDC leadership, is leading the talk with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. His aides from the Office of Strategic Studies are holding regular meetings with Daw Suu. Daw Suu has access to the NLD central executive committee through U Lwin, who is meeting with her twice a week. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, led by a former ICRC official based in Rangoon, has been facilitating the process. The UN Special Envoy has regular contact with the SPDC Foreign Ministry and has kept the international key players informed about the development of the talks. We have also observed that some foreign dignitaries and diplomats have been allowed to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

We have witnessed the regime exhibit some positive gestures since the start of the talks. On Jan 25, U Tin Oo, Vice-Chairman of the NLD, was released from detention after four months in the Ye Mon interrogation Centre. Nineteen NLD Youth members who were arrested along with U Tin Oo were also released on that day. Other NLD Youth members, who were arrested at the Rangoon Central Railway Station when Daw Suu was obstructed from traveling to Mandalay, were also released. During the second week of January, military authorities instructed their controlled media to end attacks against the NLD leadership. During these days, we have observed that the regime has provided some space for reorganization of the NLD. Party signboards that were previously pulled down by the USDA and local SPDC authorities have been reestablished. Township level organizing committee have been reorganized. Moreover, the Youth Wing of the NLD has been reorganized in many townships.

Although the NCGUB perceives these developments to be positive, we also believe that we need to be cautious. This is not the first time the Burmese military has entered into dialogue with its political opponents. In 1962, the Revolutionary Council, which was the first generation of the current military regime, entered into dialogue with all of the country's armed resistance groups. In 1994, Gen. Than Shwe and Gen Khin Nyunt met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi while she was under house arrest. Most of us are well aware of the failure of previous peace negotiations.

In conjunction with its provision of partial gestures, we should be careful not to miss the fact that the military wooed the international community into lifting sanctions that had been imposed on Burma and warned that any international pressure could undermine the dialogue process. Gen. Khin Nyunt, Secretary (2) of the SPDC, claimed that although the military is committed to democracy , the Western style of democracy doesn't fit with Burma. The military refuses to yield its philosophy of "disciplined democracy," or, in other words, "the supremacy of military over the civilian". Therefore, we feel it necessary to caution the international community that:

• Given these considerations, the international community must be careful not to prematurely relax the existing pressure mechanisms before talks have reached the stage where they become irreversible and have developed into a process of genuine dialogue. The talks cannot be deemed a "dialogue" until the following conditions are fulfilled:
  

• The parties are able to talk in freedom as equals;
  
• The parties can select their own representatives at the same level;
  
• The talks deal with political issues and are not one-sided;
  
• There is a facilitator or mediator (ASEAN, UN or otherwise) involved; and
  
• The parties make joint statements/declarations.
  Given the strengths and weaknesses of key players in Burma, we envisage the following scenarios.

  I. A deepening dialogue process and a negotiated political settlement: This is possible if both the military regime and the NLD agree to start substantive negotiations to end the crisis in Burma. The underlying economic and social crisis further erodes the foundation of the regime, and NLD's call for substantive and meaningful dialogue could win support from some sections of the armed forces. The prevailing conditions in Burma seem to point in this direction, and the NCGUB looks forward to seeing some official announcement from both sides to formalize the talks.

  II. Collapse of talks and return to protracted status quo: Conditions surrounding the current talks are fragile, and the possibility of the military retreating to the status quo is very real. This could happen if the military believes that they can recover from the current economic decline if some donors prematurely decide to resume development aid and the generals regain enough confidence to institutionalize military rule.

  III. Peoples' uprising and chaotic violence: This is possible if the SPDC fails to provide basic needs for the people, especially the urban population. Urban rioting will provoke massive suppression by the military.
  
  Violent chaos could follow such uprisings and, in turn, bring about international condemnation of the SPDC. At this point, the general public may wait for the progress of dialogue between the NLD and military authorities, and the breakdown of talks could ignite a public backlash.

  Given these possible scenarios, the NCGUB believes that strengthening the current talks is the only desirable scenario for the future of Burma. It is indeed the only feasible way to advance democratization in Burma.

  In order to attain the goal of enhancing the dialogue process in Burma, we need to strengthen our diplomatic engagement with key international players and ensure that existing pressure mechanisms are maintained. No international actor should take unilateral initiative without consultation with the Burmese democracy movement. The international community's strategy should be to support the dialogue process by ensuring that no one 'gives carrots' without prior consultation. The timing of when to give a carrot is critical. The international community should take further steps to advance and broaden the talks. SPDC's adherence to the terms of the consecutive UN resolutions, which were adopted by consensus, and its compliance with ILO requirements regarding the use of forced labor should be the benchmarks in measuring the progress of dialogue.

  We also need to promote public visibility, recognition, and support of the dialogue process in Burma by launching common international campaigns. These are the Nobel Laureates Solidarity Campaign; the MP Solidarity Campaign; the Political Party Solidarity Campaign; and the ILO Campaign. Coordination is the key word for the success of our efforts. It can be maximized by common international campaigns as well as by supporting and linking national and regional efforts. We also hope that our support base in the international arena can be expanded through these campaigns and build up a ground for rapid response capability to an emergency crisis situation, if such should happen inside Burma.

  Before I conclude, let me express my appreciation and gratitude to all Burma support groups throughout the world for their relentless and selfless efforts over the past 12 years for the restoration of democracy and human rights in Burma. I am sure that your sacrifices and contributions will bear fruit in the near future. Let's prepare for the worst, but hope for the best.

  Thank you.