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• Daw Aung San Suu Kyi • Dr.Sein Win • others Printable Version

The Burmese Military's Last Chance ( Far Eastern Economic Review )

By Zaw Oo

Issue cover-dated July 19, 2001

The writer is coordinator of the Technical Advisory Network of Burma and a doctoral candidate at the School of International Service of the American University in Washington

After 12 years of rule, the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw, has lost its capacity to govern, particularly in managing the complex task of economic reform. The military opened talks with Aung San Suu Kyi eight months ago. The talks, presumably still at the "confidence-building" stage, prompt this question: Will the military soon extricate itself from power and facilitate wider democratization in Burma? But in truth, the question is not whether the military has to extricate itself. Rather, it is how and when.

Meanwhile, the military has reached a stage where its role as a government is now seriously undermining its other role as an army institution. Ten years ago, the military government decided to expand the army to 500,000 servicemen. This ambitious plan in effect broke the back of the economy, aided the emergence of powerful regional commanders (and with it the rise of warlordism) and retarded military professionalism as thousands were drafted without proper training. Not surprisingly, desertion is rising, while most units are pushed into living off the land. As a result, extortion, the drug trade and forced labour have become widespread.

The military needs to address these internal problems. There is the inequality of power and influence between military and political positions, where political appointments determine which officers get rich. This inequality fuels dangerous rifts within the military. Also, the military intelligence apparatus is getting so powerful that it is making crucial political decisions. But their power lacks proper institutional grounding.

Finally, the military's own constitutional proposal makes it very difficult to "civilianize" the regime. It proposed five years ago that a strong president--which it expected would be its own man--would head Burma. But the military's constitutional experts also slipped in a clause that states that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rather than the president, possesses the authority to declare state emergencies and dissolve government. It is understood that the clause was inserted as a strategy to maintain the military's dominance. In the process, this has made increasing civilian control more difficult by confusing two sources of authority. Given such an unstable foundation, the military does not have the luxury of sticking blindly to a deadly status quo. It must move on.

Searching for a sensible way to extricate itself from its current position as an illegitimate and hated government is a much worthier goal for the military than trying to resuscitate a failing regime at all costs. And if the military is serious about this, the country would be willing to help restore the military's original role as a patriotic army of the people. Here, there are three options to consider.

First, the military can consider transferring power to the country's legitimate leaders, those elected in the 1990 elections. The current talks could be the venue where the terms of power transfer are discussed or negotiated.

Secondly, if the immediate transfer of power is too dangerous for the military to contemplate, it could consider forming a government of national unity with elected representatives and others, particularly from national groups. This interim government could then establish a transition period, within which attempts to resolve serious national problems would be jointly undertaken, and organize new elections to renew the people's mandate.

Lastly, the military could begin serious political liberalization and put civilians in charge of the administration. However, this gradual strategy has the least chance of success, particularly in a situation where there is an absence of institutions and procedures to mobilize public acceptance.

For the democratic opposition, all three options can be considered in order of preference, but with genuine political liberalization as the bottom line. For Burma to survive with its integrity intact, the military must agree to democratization, but at a pace negotiated with civil-society forces and other elements. However, such a pace has serious time constraints. Economic factors mostly underlie the urgency of the solution, but more seriously, the Aids epidemic poses a great time pressure on all sides. A peaceful, orderly but timely transition through dialogue is the military's last chance to become the true saviour of the nation. Of course, it is also the last chance for all Burmese to unite again to save the country.